These are the handouts for the overview lectures I provide on parenthood: legal parental status and parental responsibility. I cover the following issues (issues 1-3 were lectured on this year; issue 4 was included last year; and issue 5 two years ago):
- Issue 1 – Who or what is a parent? [handout here];
- Issue 2 – Legal motherhood [handouts here and here];
- Issue 3 – Legal fatherhood [handouts here and here];
- Issue 4 – Parental responsibility [handouts from last year here and here];
- Issue 5 – The relationship between legal parental status and parental responsibility [handout from two years’ ago here].
These are the handouts for the overview lectures I provide on financial provision upon relationship breakdown. The focus here is on the breakdown of status relationships; the final issue, which compares status and non-status relationships was discussed as part of last year’s lectures:
- Issue 1 – (Preliminary matters and) the debate over the normative basis of ancillary relief [handout here];
- Issue 2 – Outline of governing legal principles and case law, including the extension of governing legal principles to marriage between same sex couples and civil partnership [handouts here and here];
- Issue 3 – Private ordering and procedural aspects [handout here];
- Issue 4 – Reform of the law governing ancillary relief [handout here];
- Issue 5 – Comparison between the legal regime governing the financial consequences of the breakdown of status relationships and the approach taken to non-status relationships [comparison chart here and handout here].
(co-authored with Naomi Webber, University of Oxford)
Non-lawyers implement the law on permanent exclusion, particularly school management teams, with the support and guidance of local authority (LA) officers.
In this review, we evaluate the contents of, and relationship between law and practice to examine to what extent they are coherent. Divergence between law and practice is not of itself a basis for criticising the actions of non-lawyers, but instead suggests that the law might not be fit for purpose. The law should support ‘best practices’ and restrain practice that is not in the “best interests” of either the individual child at risk of exclusion and/or of other children and staff in the school.
Our discussion focuses on recent research and secondary literature, as well as our own scoping survey of permanent exclusion in schools across four LAs in the same Department for Education (DfE) Statistical First Release (SFR) region. The second section outlines the current law, presents statistical changes in the rate of exclusions and appeals lodged over time and analyses how reforms to the law and legal framework may have affected the statistics. The third section evaluates the values that underpin the legal framework, particularly autonomy, equality, “best interests”, and participation and procedural rights. The fourth section examines current knowledge of the way in which the law is understood by various groups of non-lawyers in the exclusion process. This section also draws on findings from our scoping survey, conducted between July and September 2014. Our scoping survey highlights the potential significance of school and LA culture within this legal discretionary framework in determining the likelihood that a pupil will be excluded. In particular, analysis of individual schools’ responses regarding exclusions against publicly available data on their pupil-level risk factors and indicators of school culture suggest that school culture and disposition toward the governing law has a role to play in determining the likelihood that a pupil will be excluded. This role has not been examined to date, and our scoping survey results reveal it is a complex one, which may also be interwoven with the LA culture and disposition towards the governing law. The work of LA inclusion and exclusion officers is central to this latter issue. Finally, we highlight a number of more discrete matters for further research.
Note: Our review has been updated to include discussion of reforms introduced by the DfE’s 2015 statutory guidance on exclusion.
This paper is published by the University of Oxford (2015), and also available here.
The High Court’s decision in S v S  EWHC 7 (Fam) (S) is the first to give judicial endorsement to the Institute of Family Law Arbitrators’ (IFLA) scheme for parties to use arbitration to resolve the financial consequences of marriage and civil partnership breakdown. The significance of the decision extends beyond the case itself. Sir James Munby P’s judgment is important in four respects: first, he guides courts as to the process to adopt when considering applications made in the context of arbitral awards; second, he makes critical suggestions for future procedural innovations and rule changes; third, he directs courts as to how to weigh the substantive content of arbitral awards against section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 when hearing applications for consent orders and attempts to resile from the arbitral award; fourth, he comments on autonomy as the underlying theoretical basis for this substantive approach to arbitral awards.
This paper is published in (2015) 37 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 99-101, and available here.
In this article, I argue for caution in embracing family arbitration as a new form of private ordering for resolving parties’ financial disputes. I explain that family arbitration may be more successful than other forms of private ordering and final court hearings in enabling certain types of parties to resolve certain types of disputes. Given that lawyer-led negotiations remain the most common form of out-of-court resolution, however, family arbitration’s impact may not be numerically significant. But family arbitration may be much more important in normative terms. Together with the transformation in approach to nuptial agreements, we may soon reach the position where it is no longer accurate to say that we are bargaining in the shadow of the default regime – the factual default of private ordering may become the autonomy-based normative default. I question whether this is a desirable step for family law, at least before we have resolved the underlying policy debate.
This paper is published in (2013) 35: 1 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 115-138, and available here.